The latest spate of violence has claimed over 830 lives since December 2005 and left tens of thousands internally displaced in northeast Sri Lanka. Since the Eelam War officially began in 1983, well over 60,000 lives have been lost and over 353,000 internally displaced. At present, a Low Intensity Conflict is intensifying. The Kebethigollewa attack has been the biggest single blow to civilian life, claiming 63. The recent attacks on the Trincomalee Naval Base were perhaps too close to home for Government forces, having suffered the initial shock of an attack on the Army Commander well within the confines of Headquarters. However, even though the military has suffered several setbacks since, the biggest blow has been to civilian life – the focal point of any terrorist violence. Cutting out water supplies to farmer communities in Mavil Aru was the latest tactic of the LTTE in coercing the Sri Lankan state to negotiate on the terms of the Tigers. Government forces of course, responded with artillery strikes and rebuffed a Norwegian brokered deal with the Tigers. The sluice gates at Mavil Aru have been reopened but the town of Muttur has been shelled. The extent of collateral damage is still unclear but the country now stands on the brink of full scale war. To speak of the Ceasefire Agreement at this point in time would be akin to being blind to the truth. The truce is now a mere dysfunctional part of a heavily bloodied history, as Colombo tries everything within itself to stave off a fourth war. The LTTE for its part, would hope for rioting in the south and perhaps also hope for soldiers to break barracks, in response to their escalated offensives, a situation in which Colombo would lose control and in which international opinion would be at heavy odds with the status-quo regime. Pointing to human rights violations by the state is an undeniable trump card in the context of the ailing international image of the former. Rajapaksha has remained patient for the most part and ensured that any strikes were calculated military offensives, dealt with rapid force. Such offensives have no doubt won him acclaim in the south but what of the civilians in the north and east? As cycles of violence engulf the region, collateral damage remains inevitable. Past Tiger tactics of attacking soft targets and using human shields have made affairs doubly difficult for Sri Lankan troops. It should however, be a foregone conclusion that this war cannot be won. The state is fiscally incapable of purchasing the firepower with which to win this war. Moreover, in combating guerrillas such as the LTTE, the risk of claiming further civilian lives looms large – indeed, the Tigers often thrive on the usage of human shields. Further, a solution to legitimate Tamil grievances cannot be brought about through Colombo’s military might.
Of foreign intervention, India has once burnt its fingers and would certainly not engage itself in another military operation. However, it would undoubtedly use its soft power with which to coerce the Tigers to renegotiate. For the Tigers, Colombo must offer a tangible option for devolution, which would be agreeable to the Tamils of the northeast. It must abandon the thesis of the ‘dharma-dveepa’ and embrace secularist policies in a constructive manner. Kilinochchi, for its own part, would do well to remain objective in its goals but perhaps the biggest question is: can Prabhakaran abandon a quest for Eelam, even if he so wishes, at this late stage? Did all those cadres who gave their lives, do so in vain? Undoubtedly, this remains high on the list of dilemmas facing the Tamil Tiger leadership. With the use of nationalism to mobilise masses on the scale of that done among the Tamils of northeast Sri Lanka comes the challenge of compromising on demands at the expense of the deflated ideals of a separatist dream.
In a landmark development, the Karuna Faction has opened political offices in Colombo. How many seats will the faction win at the next elections? Does the party have the potency with which to pose a credible challenge in the mainstream, to the LTTE proxy TNA? These factors – although doubtful at present – remain to be seen. It would be especially interesting to watch the policy of the Government and whether it seizes on the opportunity to place a wedge and isolate the LTTE.
Back to the battlefront: the gunfire has to stop. The international community must lobby hard for the two sides to return to the table. However, more significantly, the people of Sri Lanka must make their voices heard. They must tell the main protagonists that enough is enough and urge both parties to return for talks. No peace talks however, will materialise unless tangible proposals are put forth. Both sides must be constructive in their approaches and deviate from the norm. They must set aside a bitter history and engage in innovative thought. The Kumaratunga proposals of 2000 should also be reconsidered. The Liam Fox Agreement that calls for corporation between the GOSL and the Opposition on issues of national importance should be adhered to. However, all that is tried and tested at the table will be doomed to fail empirically, unless hopes of peace are carried through to the masses and the capacities for this hope of a lasting peace are cultivated at grass-root level. If this is not done, an end to the present conflict maybe nowhere in sight.
5 comments:
The GOSL responded to the crisis in the only manner that a democratic government with a standing army would response.
In any war, the casualties are the civillians. Howevever, waging for is a matter of life and death for a state. As the World War II amply showed, refusing to wage war today might only lead to a bitter war tomrorow, killing & maiming many more civilians. A point in case is the German crossing of the Rhine in 30's, prior to the WW II, during which time both Great Britain and US refused to come to aid of France to push back the marching German Armies and instead "urged" the French to "negotiate". The rest is history. Had the Britain and US forces have thrown their lot with the French and beaten back the German Armies, we would have actually avoided the WWII but of course, the Peace Treat that was is force at that time would have been violated and there would have been deaths, both civilian and military.
It is important to separate the Tamil Community and the Tigers. The aspirations and legitmate grievances of the Tamil Community should be looked after. However, no government can even consider any "devolution" whilst there is an armed terrorist group as brutal as LTTE and as murderous as LTTE is in operation. Therefore, if a lasting solution is to be found, the GOSL will have to:
1. Kill as many terrorists as possible as fast as possible.
2. Neutralize as many terrorist sympathisers as possible.
3. Seek and neutralize all those who give "ideological" and "PR" support to terrorists.
4. Workout a political package that can address the aspiratins and legitimate grievances of the Tamil Community.
However, above (4) cannot be implemnted until 1, 2 and 3 are accomplish.
I am not proposing eliminating the LTTE to the last man. But a significant proportion of its fighting cardre should be decimated prior to embarking upon implementing any solution.
Given the limitations that the flawed CFA has place on the security forces of the GOSL, it is important that the GOSL utilize the opportunities given by LTTE to inflict maximum damage upon it, backed by good intelligence.
The threat of Tigers taking out soft targets will always there. One may argue that such threat would increase if the GOSL takes military measures but the history shows that LTTE has never hesitated, irrespective of GOSL actions.
The LTTE attempts on soft targets should be answered with coordinated action against the terrorist heartland, Killinochichi and taking out infrastructure that allows them to operate in the uncleared area , such as roads, bridges, communicationss etc.
your whole post assumes that ltte will want to talk peace.
as history has shown countless times they do not . only language they know is violence. when they want something they will go for it using violence and threats whatever agreements they have signed or whatever international community says. recent water blockade and in fact the fate of cfa from the first ( not just now) is are just two examples.
you confuse tamils with ltte. ltte is not fighting for a separate tamil country. it is fighting for a personal dictatorship nothing else. do not legitimize them. by accepting their propaganda at face value.
their insistence on sole representative status proves they do not want peace, their preference for violence, and their contempt for democracy and human rights.
as long as ltte remains what it is no agreement with them would work. nor should government hand over more power to the ltte to oppress more people in sri lanka. it is government's duty to protect sri lankans and ensure that they can exercise their rights, enjoy freedom , participate in democratic politics, and are justly treated. putting ppl under ltte rule goes against all of that.
yes gosl may not be able to win militarily bt that does not mean it has to give up all of that. gosl should make it clear to all that it is willing to talk to and hold the ceasefire with ltte but only as a temporary measure bc it is the pragmatic thing, not bc it is the correct thing. it should also make clear ( if not directly, indirectly)it will not come to a substantive agreement as long as ltte remains what it is.
tamil grievances can only be addressed through legitimately elected represtaives not through ltte. till such representatives emerge government may hold the ceasefire but it should not give in to ltte demands. it should ensure ltte do not gain anything during the ceasefire. it is more than probable ltte will weaken during inactive ceasefire periods (evidence seem to indicate that ) . if ltte tries to break the ceasefire in small scale or in large scale government should respond robustly.
ltte must be made to understand all they are going to get is what they have now at present and even that illegitimately (only bc government is unable to win militarily.) that if they choose war they wont go far. and for talks to proceed beyond ceasefire they have to change .
all that means we will not have peace for sometime. but obtaining 'peace' by giving ltte what it want is worse, and given their history will not end in nominal peace either.
There's no doubt that "Peace talks are good". But, the obvious reality is LTTE don't want "a real negotiation". For the last 2 decades, they haven't moved away an inch from the "Separate state" concept, while all the governments took part in discussions, compromised yards towards the same concept. All people who put pressure on "Peace talks" keep pushing the governments to talk, and be constructive, and be flexible. But none of them are saying a word about how rigid LTTE was during all past efforts for peace via talks. They haven't given up anything, while SL governments changed their stances time to time from, "Sinhala Only", to "Unitary State with de-centralized power" to "United Sri Lanka, with a federal solution".
What are we expecting more from peace talks? Government to move another step towards the ultimate objective of terrorists?
Yes, we can achieve peace through talks if we agree to all demands of tigers as many people suggest "to be flexible". But is it a real peace?
imo, talks should directed towards, bringing LTTE to the main stream politics within 1 Sri Lanka. They should first give up the "separate state" concept, to build the credibility of future talks. Unless, any future talks would end up just like in the past. Then, gradually they should be dis armed and should become another democratic political party, without trying to rule by weapons.
Many people blame JVP, saying they set the example in 1971, for Tamils to carry weapons.
If we accept that as a true argument, why cant LTTE take another example from JVP, and come to the main stream politics like JVP? Do they want to wait until their leader die, just like JVP?
Peace talks are not bad. But, for all those people who advocate "Talk, talk, and more talk" I like to suggest them to learn the history of peace talks as well. Study, who had been flexible & constructive during past talks. Study who had been rigid, and violated the agreements of talks. Was it GOSL or LTTE?
Sittingnut,
My whole post does not 'assume' that the LTTE will want to talk peace and I do not legitimise the LTTE. I speak of coercive tactics and attacking of soft targets - in the context, hardly legitimising. I do not believe that this requires further explanation; read the post carefully. My argument is based on two main premises:
a) Enough lives lost/ruined.
b) Over two decades of bloodshed shows there is no military solution.
I'm a bit lost as to where I confuse the Tamil community with the LTTE... but thanks for your comments - they're always welcome.
you are right your 'whole' post does not assume tigers are willing to talk peace, but your conclusion where you assume that all the urgings and proposals will make them talk, does.
you also assume that talking (with inevitable sole representative status) and giving concessions to ltte, will address tamil grievances. that is what i meant by legitimizing and equating tamils with ltte.
ltte should be considered separately from tamils in order to arrive at a solution acceptable morally and politically.
as long as ltte is there lives are going to be lost and ruined.
yes gosl may not be able to defeat the ltte militarily , but that does not mean it should be given more power. imo prolonging the status quo (and trying the keep the conflict as low as possible) is better than 'peace' with ltte as long as it remains what it is..
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